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ABSTRACT
Online gaming is one of the largest industries on the Internet, gen-
erating tens of billions of dollars in revenues annually. One core
problem in online game is to find and convert free users into pay-
ing customers, which is of great importance for the sustainable de-
velopment of almost all online games. Although much research
has been conducted, there are still several challenges that remain
largely unsolved: What are the fundamental factors that trigger the
users to pay? How does users’ paying behavior influence each other
in the game social network? How to design a prediction model to
recognize those potential users who are likely to pay?
In this paper, employing two large online games as the basis,
we study how a user becomes a new paying user in the games.
In particular, we examine how users’ paying behavior influences
each other in the game social network. We study this problem from
various sociological perspectives including strong/weak ties, social
structural diversity and social influence. Based on the discovered
patterns, we propose a learning framework to predict potential new
payers. The framework can learn a model using features associated
with users and then use the social relationships between users to
refine the learned model.
We test the proposed framework using nearly 50 billion user ac-
tivities from two real games. Our experiments show that the pro-
posed framework significantly improves the prediction accuracy by
up to 3-11% compared to several alternative methods. The study
also unveils several intriguing social phenomena from the data. For
example, influence indeed exists among users for the paying be-
havior. The likelihood of a user becoming a new paying user is 5
times higher than chance when he has 5 paying neighbors of strong
tie. We have deployed the proposed algorithm into the game, and
the Lift_Ratio has been improved up to 196% compared to the prior
strategy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Miscellaneous; H.2.8
[Database Management]: Data Mining
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation
Keywords
Social game, Social networks, User behavior modeling
1. INTRODUCTION
Online gaming is one of the largest industries on the Internet,
generating tens of billions of dollars in revenues annually. Accord-
ing to Facebook’ first quarter report in 2013, it has 250 million peo-
ple playing games on Facebook monthly, and there are about 200
games right now on Facebook with more than 1 million active users
each. About 12% of the company’s revenue is directly from games.
(This number does not even include the advertising shown along-
side the games.) The situation is the same in China. Tencent is the
largest Internet company and also the largest game service provider
in China. It has more than 400 million gaming users. The payment
revenue from games accounts for roughly 50% of Tencent’s overall
revenue.
In online game, one key problem is how to design strategies to
keep players not just playing, but also paying. This is important
for the sustainable development of the whole game industry. The
problem has attracted attention of both academic and industry com-
munities. For example, Yee [30] investigated how players differ
from one another and how motivations of play relate to age, gen-
der, usage patterns, and in-game behaviors. Recently, online games
are becoming more and more social. Statistics show that 80% of
Zynga’s1 revenue comes from Facebook users. Traditional research
mainly focuses on analyzing users’ personal attributes but ignores
the social effects. Ducheneaut and Moore [11] studied the users’
interaction patterns in the online game. Ducheneaut et al. [12] fur-
ther used longitudinal data collected from the online game to ex-
amine play and grouping patterns. They found several interesting
patterns that affect the formation and longevity of gaming commu-
nities. However, they do not consider users’ paying behavior. In
practice, users’ play patterns and social activities in the game are
strongly affected by their paying status.
In this paper, we try to systematically study users’ paying behav-
ior in online game. Precisely, we aim to understand what are the
fundamental factors that trigger free users to pay. The problem is
nontrivial and poses a set of unique challenges:
• Sparsity: the paying behavior is rather rare compared to tra-
ditional Internet applications such as recommendation and
1The largest game provider on Facebook.
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Figure 1: Relative improvement in message read rate, message
clicked rate and conversion rate compared to the prior strategy
in (a) Online test 1 (with 0.8 million users), (b) Online test 2 (with 1
million users).
ranking. Zynga has more than 200 million monthly users;
however only 3% of the users have purchased credits in the
game.
• Social effects: social activity has already become one of the
most important elements in designing online games. How is
users’ paying behavior influenced by friends and the social
structure?
• Predictive models: in order to effectively identify poten-
tial paying users, it is important to develop methods that can
combine users’ attributes and the social effects.
By carefully studying users’ paying behavior in large online
game networks, we have discovered several intriguing social pat-
terns. For example, strong influence on paying behavior indeed
exists among users. The likelihood that a user who has 5 paying
neighbors of strong tie becomes a new payer is 5 times higher than
that of an average user. Meanwhile, when a user is aware that his
friends have already paid a lot in the game, his willingness to pay
will quickly cool down.
Based on the discoveries, we propose a learning framework re-
ferred to as local consistent factorization machines (LCFM) model.
The framework can learn a model using features associated with
users and then use the social relationships between users to locally
regularize the learned model. By trading off the global optimum
and the local regularization terms, the framework achieves a learn-
ing solution with local and global consistency. Our experiments
show that the proposed framework significantly improves the pre-
diction accuracy by up to 3-11% compared with several alternative
methods. We have deployed the proposed algorithm into the games.
Specifically, we use the proposed algorithm to predict who are the
most likely to pay in the game. Then the system automatically
sends a message to those users suggested by the algorithm. If a user
responds and starts to pay in the game, we say the algorithm makes
a correct prediction. We compare the proposed algorithm with the
prior strategy used in the game (Cf. §6 for details). Figure 1 re-
ports the relative improvement of the proposed algorithm against
the prior strategy in two real online tests (with 800,000∼1,000,000
chosen users). It can be seen that the conversion rate (from free user
to paying user) has been significantly improved up to 126-196%
compared to the prior strategy.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the dataset we use for our study; Section 3
presents indepth analysis on the data; Section 4 defines features
Table 1: Statistics of the datasets.
Category Type QQSpeed DNF
User
all users 7.60M 347K
free users ∼ 106 ∼ 105
paying users ∼ 106 ∼ 105
new payers ∼ 105 ∼ 104
Relationship co-playing 134M 7.30M
Guild guilds 600K 49.6K
co-guild 66.7M 51.7M
Activity activity types 58 64
activity logs 44.7B 5.71B
Date span from 2013.6.20 2013.4.1
to 2013.8.20 2013.6.30
used in the learning model; Section 5 describes our proposed model
for the problem; Section 6 gives experimental results that validate
the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed framework; Sec-
tion 7 presents related work; and finally Section 8 concludes the
work.
2. DATASET
We study the problem in two large online games: Dungeon &
Fighter Online (DNF), the second largest online game in China,
and QQSpeed, the fourth largest online game in China.
DNF is a game of melee combat between one user and an im-
probably large number of underpowered enemies. In 2013, the
game attracted more than 400 million users from the world. Users
in the game can fight against enemies as individuals, or form a
group to fight together.
The DNF dataset comprises of all kinds of user activities from
sampled users of the game during the period from Apr. 1st, 2013
to Jun. 30th, 2013. The user activities include subtraction of user
money, change of user level, killing mob in games and etc. In sum-
mary, there are 5.71 billion activity logs from 347 thousand users.
QQSpeed is a racing game that users can take part in racing
competitions to play against other users. The game is the largest
online racing game in China and attracted more than 200 million
users in 2013. Users in the game can race against other users as
individuals, or form a group to race together. The game provider
earns money by selling virtual items in the in-game shop, including
different types of vehicles and accessories.
The QQSpeed dataset comprises of all kinds of user activities of
sampled users in the game during the period from Jun. 20th, 2013
to Aug. 20th, 2013. There are totally 44.7 billion activity logs from
7.60 million users.
In addition, the two datasets also contain the paying logs of all
the users. Based on the paying logs, we classify the users into three
categories: free user, paying user and new payer, according to their
paying behavior. Take QQSpeed for example. We categorize the
users who have paying behavior before Jun. 20th, 2013 as paying
users. For those users who do not have paying behavior before Jun.
20th, 2013, but paid during Jun. 20th, 2013 to Aug. 20th, 2013, we
call them new payers. And the remaining users who do not have
any paying behavior are considered as free users.
Besides, both games provide a guild system. A guild is similar
to a community (group). Any player can request to join an existing
guild or create a new guild and invite other players to join. The
guild has different levels. Members of a high-level guild can gain
additional experience in the game, and on the other hand, a guild
can level up when many of its members are logged into the game.
In DNF and QQSpeed, we consider two types of relationships.
If two users have played together, we deem the two users are
connected, which is considered to be the first type of relation-
ship. Specifically, in DNF, we consider two users are connected
if they joined in the same group to fight enemies together, and in
QQSpeed, we consider two users are connected if they joined in the
same competition to race together. We call this type of relationship
as co-playing relationship. Besides, we also consider the strength
of this relationship. If two users have played together for more than
5 times, we call the relationship as a strong tie, otherwise weak tie.
(Cf. Figure 3(b) for more analysis for strong/weak ties.) The other
type of relationship is derived from the guild system: if two users
join in the same guild, then we consider a co-guild relationship be-
tween them. For a specific user v, we call those users NB(v) who
have a co-playing relationship (or a co-guild relationship) with this
user as his/her neighbors, and those neighbors who have already
paid in the game, i.e., NB′(v) ⊆ NB(v), as paying neighbors.
Based on above methods, we construct a game network of 263
thousand users with 7.3 million co-playing relationships and 52
million co-guild relationships in DNF, and a game network of 3.54
million users with 134 million co-playing relationships and 66.7
million co-guild relationships in QQSpeed. Table 1 shows statis-
tics of the datasets. For simplicity, we only consider the co-playing
relationship in the following analysis and experiments, but the pro-
posed model can be easily transferred to different types of relation-
ship.
3. OBSERVATIONS
We first engage in some high-level investigation of how different
factors influence users’ paying behavior, since a major motivation
of our work is to find out what the fundamental factors are that
trigger users to pay in online game. In particular, we focus on the
interplay of the following factors with the paying behavior in online
game: (1) Demographics: how do users’ demographic attributes
affect their paying behavior? (2) Social effects: Do users who have
the same relationships tend to have similar paying behavior? How
do different social factors, e.g., strong/weak tie and social structural
diversity, influence users’ paying behavior? To which extent?
Due to limited space, we only present the analysis results in
game QQSpeed, but similar results can be derived from the DNF
dataset as well.
3.1 Demographics
We examine the correlation of the following demographic at-
tributes against the paying behavior.
Gender: according to the gender of the user, we classify users
into two groups - Male and Female.
Level: a number that represents the user’s overall skill and ex-
perience. Improving level needs accomplishing tasks and partic-
ipating in matches. By gaining a level, a user’s abilities will en-
hance, and meanwhile he could play with users in higher levels. In
QQSpeed, the user’s level ranges from 1 to 200. We use a density-
based discretization method [26] to classify users into three groups:
Low Level, Middle Level, and High Level.
Login: represents the number of days that a user logins into the
game during the two months. We evenly divide the game users into
two groups - Login Bottom and Login Top to represent users who
login less frequently and more frequently respectively.
Relation: an attribute that represents whether a user has at least
one co-playing relationship with others.
Guild: an attribute that represents whether a user has joined a
guild.
Centrality: an attribute that represents whether a user is a cen-
trality in the network. In network analysis, centrality of a node
measures its relative importance within a graph. We use the PageR-
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Figure 2: Correlation analysis of users’ demographic attributes
against the paying behavior.
ank[23] algorithm to calculate the centrality scores of all the users
and select the top 10% users2 with the highest PageRank score as
centrality users and the rest as ordinary user.
SH: an attribute that represents whether a user is a struc-
tural hole spanner [7] in the network. In sociology, a structural
hole spanner represents the user who connects different communi-
ties [2]. We use the HIS algorithm [22] to estimate the structural
hole score (with the following formula).
I(v, Ci) = max
euv∈E,
S⊆C∧Ci∈S
{I(v, Ci), αiI(u,Ci) + βSH(u, S)}
H(v, S) = min
Ci∈S
{I(v, Ci)}
where C = {C1, · · · , Cl} denotes l communities in the network,
I(v, Ci) ∈ [0, 1] be the importance of v in community Ci and
H(v, S) ∈ [0, 1] as the structural hole score of v in S, i.e., the
likelihood of v spanning structural holes across all communities
in S, S ⊆ C. The communities in the relationship network are
detected by using Clauset-Newman-Moore algorithm [8].
Results. We use relative risk to study the effect of different
attributes on user’s paying behavior. Relative risk is an effect mea-
sure widely used in statistics and other fields. The relative risk of
new payer associated with an attribute i can be calculated as fol-
lows:
RR(i) =
P (new payer|has attribute i)
P (new payer|does not have attribute i)
For a specific attribute, a larger relative risk indicates that users
with this attribute are more likely to become new payers. The re-
sults are given in Figure 2. We can see that the probability of a male
user becoming a new payer is 1.2 times as high as that of a female
user, which suggests that male users are easier to pay than female
users. Moreover, users in the middle level group have higher prob-
ability to become a new payer than the others. This sounds reason-
able because low level users might be unfamiliar with the game, and
high level users might already play very well in the game, thus have
2Statistics have shown that 12% of users form core groups to ac-
tively play together[13].
0 5 10 15 20
Number of Paying Neighbors
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
x3
x5
(a) Social Influence
0 2 4 6 8 10
Number of Paying Neighbors
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
x4
Strong Tie - 10
Strong Tie - 5
Strong Tie - 3
Weak Tie
(b) Strong/Weak tie
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Average of Paying Neighbors' Money Consumption
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
x3
x2
(c) Paying status
Figure 3: Convert probability conditioned on paying neighbors. Y-axis: probability that a free user converts to a paying user; X-axis: (a) the
number of paying neighbors, (b) the number of paying neighbors of different types of relationships, (c) the total amount of money paid by the paying
neighbors.
no incentive to pay in the game. For login frequency, the probabil-
ity of becoming a new payer for the Login Top group is five times
higher than that of the Login Bottom group. For the attributes of
relation and guild, the users who have relationship with others are
3 times higher in probability of becoming a new payer than users
who do not have any relationship with others, and the users who
have joined guilds are almost 3 times higher in probability of be-
coming a new payer than the users who do not join any guilds. For
centrality and structural hole, centrality users are 300% higher in
probability of becoming a new payer than other users while struc-
tural hole spanning users are 250% more likely to become a new
payer than other users. Both centrality and structural hole attributes
have positive correlation with users’ paying behavior.
3.2 Social Effects
We investigate a number of representative sociology theories and
quantitatively analyze the correlations between the users’ paying
behavior and these fundamental social concepts. Particularly, we
focus on social relationships and social structures.
3.2.1 Social Relationship
Social Influence. The principle of social influence [16, 28] sug-
gests that users tend to change their behavior so as to match to their
friends’ behaviors. Influence is an important factor that governs the
dynamics of social networks. In the game network, we try to ex-
amine whether users’ paying behavior will be influenced by their
paying neighbors. In particular, we examine the probability of a
free user becoming a new payer when he has different types of re-
lationships with other paying users.
Figure 3(a) shows the probability that a free user becomes a new
payer, conditioned on the number of paying neighbors he has in
the game network. Clearly paying money is an epidemic behavior.
Simply speaking, when a free user played with 5 paying users, the
likelihood that he will also pay increases to 3 times higher than
that he do not play with any paying users. Another trend can be
learned from Figure 3(a) is that the conversion likelihood (from a
free user to a paying user) continues to increase when the user has
more paying neighbors. Is it really true? Will different types of
relationships have different effects?
Strong/Weak Tie. We further study whether strong tie and
weak tie have different influence on users’ paying behavior. Strong
ties are connections with people who you are close to and asso-
ciate regularly with, while weak ties are more distant connections.
Strong/Weak Tie [15] is one of the most basic principles in social
network theories. Specifically, we classify the constructed social
relationships into strong ties and weak ties by the number of times
that two users played together in the game. If two users played to-
gether for more than 5 times, we call the relationship as a strong tie,
otherwise a weak tie. Figure 3(b) shows some interesting results:
strong ties indeed have strong influence on the paying behavior,
while the influence of weak ties is relatively weak. Still take the
free user with five paying neighbors for example. If the relation-
ship is strong tie, the probability that the user converts to a new
payer increases to 30%, almost 4 times higher than the case when
the relationship is weak tie, and 5 times higher than that of an aver-
age user. Figure 3(b) also shows the effect comparisons of different
definitions for the strong tie by varying the co-playing threshold. In
our prediction, we tried different values for the threshold and finally
chose 5 by cross-validation.
Status. Another interesting analysis is how the total amount of
money paid by the paying neighbors would influence the user’s
paying behavior. We calculate the total amount of money (Chi-
nese yuan) consumption denoted as consumption degree in the two
month period for each paying user in our dataset. Then we figure
out the probability of a free user becoming a new payer, condi-
tioned on the average of paying neighbors’ consumption degree,
which is round to multiples of 100 for convenience in statistics.
For users who do not have paying neighbors, the average of their
paying neighbors’ consumption degree is set to zero. We show
the results in Figure 3(c), when the average of paying neighbors’
consumption is 200, the probability is 300% higher than that of
zero. However, as the average of paying neighbors’ consumption
increases, the probability of becoming new payer drops down. This
is possibly because such users could receive more gift props from
their “rich friends” than other users.
3.2.2 Structural Diversity
Besides peer relationships, we also study how the structure of
one’s personal social circle influences his paying behavior. In par-
ticular, we leverage the idea of structural diversity [29], which sug-
gests that different inner structures of a user’s neighbors have dif-
ferent effects on the user’s behavior. We test whether the inner
structure of one’s paying friends will influence a free user to be-
come a new payer. Regarding the inner structure, we count the
number of connected components. We give an example in Fig-
ure 4, the centric node is the free user we are going to study. The
surrounding nodes are neighbors where blue nodes indicating pay-
ing users. We can see that, B and C are connected as a component;
A andD are separated as two independent components. This struc-
ture corresponds to the second one from the right in the structural
vA
B
D
C
Paying
Neighbors:
Paying
Neighbors:
Figure 4: Convert probability conditioned on the inner struc-
ture of the paying neighbors. Y-axis: probability that a free user
converts to a paying user; X-axis: the inner structure of paying neigh-
bors by taking 4 paying neighbors as the example.
spectrum analysis. We have several intriguing discoveries from the
structural spectrum analysis. First, the conversion probability (from
a free user to a new payer) generally increases with the number of
disconnected components. For example, when a user has a num-
ber of, e.g. 4, paying neighbors, if all the neighbors do not know
each other (the last one in structural spectrum analysis), then the
probability that the user will be influenced to become a new payer
is almost twice higher than the case when the four neighbors know
each other (the first one in structural spectrum analysis). This is
somehow counterintuitive, but explainable to some extent. For an
example, the first structure of the user’s paying neighbors in Fig-
ure 4 indicates that all the four neighbors know each other, which
implies that all the users are from the same circle. In this case, the
centric user may have a feeling that he can leverage the circle to
acquire some advantage (e.g., borrow an equipment from friends
of the circle in the game). On the other hand, the last structure
in Figure 4 implies that the four users may be from totally differ-
ent circles. In this case, the centric user may feel that becoming a
paying user is very common in the game, because his friends from
different circles already paid money. The second discovery is the
exception case when the paying neighbors are weakly connected,
say A is connected to B, B to C, and C to D (the third one). The
influence on the centric user’s paying behavior is very strong, but
also with a high variance.
4. FEATURE REPRESENTATION
Based on the analysis in § 3, we extract features from user at-
tributes and social relationships. In addition, we extract features
from users’ in-game behavior logs. These features are also useful
because they can capture behavioral patterns of users, say, whether
the user likes to purchase props in the game, which can comple-
ment the features extracted by attributes and relationships. To sum-
marize, the features used by our approach can be grouped into the
following three categories:
User attribute features: this category of features are derived from
user attributes based on the analysis in § 3.1, including:
• Gender: the binary feature represents the gender of the user.
• Level: the integer-valued feature represents the level of the
users.
• Login time: the real-valued feature represents the length of
time the user logins to the game.
• Relation: the binary feature represents whether the user has
at least one co-playing relationship with others.
• Guild: the binary feature represents whether the user joins
a guild.
• Centrality: the binary feature represents whether the user
is a centrality.
• SH: the binary feature represents whether the user is a struc-
tural hole spanner in the game network.
Social effect features: social effect features refer to those features
which model the social effects analyzed in Section 3.2, including:
• Paying neighbor count: the integer-valued feature repre-
sents the number of paying neighbors.
• Strong tie count: the integer-valued feature represents the
number of paying neighbors with strong tie.
• Weak tie count: the integer-valued feature represents the
number of weak tie paying neighbor with weak tie.
• Average neighbor status: the real-valued feature represents
the average amount of money paid by the paying neighbors.
• Structure diversity: two integer-valued features respec-
tively represent the number of paying neighbors and the num-
ber of connected components formed by paying neighbors.
In-game behavior features: this kind of features are extracted
from users’ in-game behavior logs, including a list of statistical
summary features such as the number of purchased items and the
sum of virtual money consumption. We also extract some domain
specific features such as the maximum value of the user’s missing
items and the number of specific competitions the user participates.
5. MODEL FRAMEWORK
Factorization models have been proposed and successfully ap-
plied to recommendation and prediction tasks [1, 17, 18, 25]. How-
ever, the traditional factorization model does not model the social
network information. We propose a local consistent factorization
machines (LCFM) model that incorporates the social network in-
formation into the factorization model.
To present the model precisely, we introduce some necessary
notations. Let G = (V,E,W,X) be a social network, where V
represents the set of all users, E represents the set of all relation-
ships, and ei,j ∈ E represents a relationship between node vi and
node vj . Each relationship ei,j ∈ E is associated with a weight
Wi,j ∈ W , which represents the strength of the relationship. X is
the set of feature vectors of all users. Based on the features defined
in Section 4, each user vi has a feature vector, denoted as xi ∈ X;
the j th entry in vector xi is denoted as xi,j ; d represents the length
of the feature vector. And yi ∈ [0, 1] indicates the paying potential
of user vi.
Next, we will first briefly introduce a generic factorization
model, the factorization machines model, and then describe the pro-
posed LCFM model.
5.1 Factorization Machines (FM) Model
Factorization Machines works with real valued feature vector
and can leverage the interactions between variables using factor-
ized parameters. This allows us to learn more complex interactions
between variables. For example, FM can learn that female users of
low level in the game have higher paying potential, whereas male
users of high level in game have lower paying potential.
For feature vector xi, the prediction is computed by:
yˆ(xi) = w0 +
d∑
j=1
wjxi,j +
d−1∑
j=1
d∑
j′=j+1
xi,jxi,j′〈pj , pj′〉 (1)
where pj , pj′ are two k-dimensional latent vectors and 〈pj , pj′〉
models the interactions between variables xi,j , xi,j′ with the dot
product of the two latent vectors:
〈pj , pj′〉 =
k∑
l=1
pj,lpj′,l (2)
Given this, Eq.(1) can be also rewritten as:
yˆ(xi) = w0+
d∑
j=1
wjxi,j+
1
2
k∑
l=1
[( d∑
j=1
pj,lxi,j
)2
−
d∑
j=1
p2j,lx
2
i,j
]
(3)
where Θ = {w0, w1, ..., wd, p1,1, ..., pd,k} are the model parame-
ters. The model has a closed model equation, and can be learned
efficiently by the gradient descent method, e.g. stochastic gradi-
ent descent (SGD), based on a variety of loss functions, like square
loss, hinge loss, etc. Here, we use square loss as loss function and
optimize the model parameters by applying L-2 regularization on
latent vector parameters to overcome the overfitting problem. The
objective function is defined as follows:
O(Θ) =
∑
vi∈V
(
yˆ(xi)− yi
)2
+ λ
d∑
i=1
‖pi‖2 (4)
where λ is a parameter that controls the regularization value. We
adopt stochastic gradient descent method to solve the objective
function. The partial derivative of yˆ(xi) with respect to the model
parameters can be written as:
∂yˆ(xi)
∂θ
=

1, if θ is w0
xi,j , if θ is wj
xi,j
∑d
f=1 pf,lxi,f − pj,lx2i,j , if θ is pj,l
(5)
Then the parameters are updated by moving in the opposite di-
rection of the gradient, yielding:
w0 ← w0 − η · 2(yˆ(xi)− yi)∂yˆ(xi)
∂w0
wj ← wj − η · 2(yˆ(xi)− yi)∂yˆ(xi)
∂wj
pj,l ← pj,l − η ·
(
2(yˆ(xi)− yi)∂yˆ(xi)
∂pj,l
+ 2λpj,l
)
(6)
where η ∈ R+ is the learning rate for gradient descent. Given a
training dataset, we iteratively update each parameter according to
the gradient until convergence or the maximum number of itera-
tions is reached. Then we can obtain the training model parameters
Θ = {w0, w1, ..., wd, p1,1, ..., pd,k}.
5.2 Local Consistent FM Model
Since the standard FM model cannot utilize the network infor-
mation between unlabeled users, we propose a Local Consistent
FM (LCFM) model that incorporates the network information by
local consistency. The general idea is that we assume neighbor-
hood nodes in the network should be similar with each other, and
the tendency depends on the strength of the relationship between
them. Formally, based on the strength weight Wi,j , we define a
consistency degree:
Input: Training network G1, test network G2, balance parameters (λ,
µ), iteration numbers T1 and T2;
Output: estimated paying potentials (yˆ1, ..., yˆ|V2|);
Initialize model parameters Θ← 0;
V ′ ← Under-sampling training users v ∈ V1;
L← a list of random shuffle v ∈ V ′;
for t = 1 to T1 do
foreach vi ∈ L do
Calculate the paying potential by Eq.(3): y˜i ← yˆ(xi);
Calculate the gradient of all parameters by Eq.(5), and update
parameters:
w0 ← w0 − η · 2(y˜i − yi) ∂∂w0 yˆ(xi);
for j ∈ {1, ..., d} ∧ xi,j 6= 0 do
wj ← wj − η · 2(y˜i − yi) ∂∂wj yˆ(xi);
for l ∈ {1, ..., k} do
pj,l ← pj,l−η ·
(
2(y˜i−yi) ∂∂pj,l yˆ(xi)+2λpj,l
)
;
end
end
end
end
Initialize paying potentials of test users by Eq.(3):
for vi ∈ V2 do
yˆi ← yˆ(xi);
end
Propagate the paying potential scores to neighborhood:
for t = 1 to T2 do
foreach vi ∈ V2 do
Update yˆi according to Eq.(9);
end
end
Algorithm 1: Learning and inference by LCFM
ci,j =
log(1 +Wi,j)∑
vj′∈NB(vi) log(1 +Wi,j
′)
(7)
where NB(vi) is the set of nodes that has a relationship with node
vi, and we use a logarithm function to smooth the link strength.
Now, the problem becomes how to combine the local consistency
degree into the FM model. Our strategy is to use a regularization
framework to define the local consistency factor as a regularization
term. In this way, we can rewrite the objective function as follows:
O(Θ) =
∑
vi∈V
(
yˆ(xi)− yi
)2
+ λ
d∑
i=1
‖pi‖2
+ µ
∑
vi∈V
∑
vj∈NB(vi)
ci,j
(
yˆ(xi)− yˆ(xj)
)2 (8)
where the third term of the right-hand side in the objective function
is the local consistency constraint, which means linked users should
have similar paying behaviors; µ > 0 is a tunable parameter to
balance the effect of the local consistency factor in the objective
function.
Model Learning. The new objective function still has a closed
model and can be solved by the SGD method. However the com-
plexity of each iteration increases to O(|E|kd), which is infeasible
in most cases. Therefore, we propose a two-step approach to sep-
arately handle the FM terms and the local consistency term in the
objective function.
In the first step, we optimize the FM terms in training data. As
the paying behavior is sparse in games, the training data might be
rather unbalanced. Hence, we firstly conduct under-sampling [19]
on the training data. Then we use SGD to solve Eq.(4), the objec-
tive function without local consistency assumption, to obtain the
estimated model parameters Θ∗.
In the second step, we optimize the local consistency terms in
test data. For each test node vi, we define yˆi as its estimated paying
potential. With the estimated model parameters Θ∗, we set the
initial value of yˆi as yˆ(xi) according to Eq.( 3). To optimize the
local consistency term, we use a propagation strategy to iteratively
update the value of yˆi. In each iteration, for every yˆi, if NB(vi) is
not empty, yˆi is updated by paying potential scores of its neighbors
as:
yˆi = (1− γµ)yˆi + γ · µ
∑
vj∈NB(vi)
ci,j yˆj (9)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter to control the propagation rate. The
learning algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Complexity analysis. The time complexity of the standard FM
model is inO(kd). The complexity of the proposed model consists
of two parts. The complexity of the first step is in O(|V |T1kd).
And for the second step of the algorithm, the time complex-
ity of each iteration is O(|E|), and the total time complexity is
O(|E|T2). Finally the total complexity is O(|V |T1kd + |E|T2),
which is much faster than directly applying SGD to solve Eq. 8, of
which the time complexity is O(|E|T1kd).
6. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first evaluate our approach in the offline
datasets described in Section 2 and compare the performance re-
sults with different approaches. We further deploy the algorithm
in the real online game system and report the online test results to
further evaluate the performance of our method.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Prediction Setting. We use the two datasets described in Section
2 in our experiments. Our task is to predict whether a free user
will become a new payer, given the user’s network information and
activity logs. We split the datasets into training and test sets by
time. For the QQSpeed dataset, the training set is comprised of
data ranged from Jun. 20th, 2013 to Jul. 19th, 2013, and the test
set is comprised of data from Jul. 20th, 2013 to Aug. 20th, 2013.
For the DNF dataset, the training set is comprised of data from Apr.
1st, 2013 to May. 31th, 2013, and the test set is comprised of data
from Jun. 1st, 2013 to Jun. 30th, 2013.
Comparison Methods. We compare our model with several
widely used recommendation models:
Factorization Machines (FM)[25]: it uses the same features as
LCFM to train factorization machines model and then employs the
model to predict users’ labels in the test set.
Logistic Regression (LRC)[20]: it trains a logistic regression
classification model and then predicts users’ labels in the test set.
SVM [14]: it trains a SVM regression model and then employs
the regression model to predict whether a free user will become a
new payer in the test data. For SVM, we employ LIBLINEAR [14].
Random Forest (RF)[5]: it trains a random forest model with
features associated with each user. Random forest is an ensemble
method. It builds a library of decision trees by random sampling
instances from the train data. Each decision tree is grown by ran-
domly selecting the features to split data upon. For random forest
Table 2: Prediction performance of different methods on the
datasets.(%)
Data Method AUC Recall Precision F1-score
QQSpeed
FM 73.61 33.16 13.62 19.31
LRC 73.17 30.75 14.00 19.24
SVM 72.78 32.72 14.13 19.74
RF 73.57 33.36 13.52 19.25
GBDT 73.64 28.88 14.44 19.25
LCFM 74.90 33.67 14.72 20.49
DNF
FM 77.56 34.76 24.51 28.75
LRC 77.03 34.78 24.25 28.57
SVM 76.48 32.53 25.31 28.47
RF 77.11 30.91 24.00 27.02
GBDT 77.73 34.10 25.05 28.88
LCFM 78.32 35.66 25.71 29.88
and the following Gradient Boosted Decision Tree (GBDT) model,
we employ scikit-learn3.
Gradient Boosted Decision Tree (GBDT)[10]: it trains a gradi-
ent boosted decision tree model with features associated with each
user. GBDT is an ensemble method. It constructs an additive re-
gression model, utilizing decision trees as the weak learner.
As for the tunable parameters k, λ, and µ in the LCFM model,
we find the best configuration through cross validation in the offline
datasets (i.e., k = 10, λ = 0.1, and µ = 0.1).
Evaluation Measures. We evaluate the performance of different
approaches in terms of Precision (Prec.), Recall (Rec.), F1-Measure
(F1), and Area Under Curve (AUC) [6].
All algorithms are implemented in C++ and Python, and the
experiments are performed on an x64 machine with E5-4650
2.70GHz Intel Xeon CPU (with 64 cores) and 128GB RAM. The
operation system is Ubuntu 12.04. The proposed algorithm has
tractable running times on networks of 7,600,000 size/order of
magnitude and requires 1 to 3 minutes for training and prediction.
6.2 Offline Performance
Results of Different Methods. Table 2 lists the results of differ-
ent methods in the offline datasets. We can see that the proposed
LCFM model clearly outperforms the baseline methods (+3-11% in
terms of F1, +1-3% in terms of AUC). The advantages of the LCFM
model lie in the following aspects. First, LCFM captures the inter-
actions between variables, therefore it can estimate more accurately
than models like LRC and SVM which can only model effect of sin-
gle variable. Second, LCFM models interactions between variables
by dot products between latent vectors, which smooths the effect of
strong variables and avoids overfitting. Third, LCFM leverages the
network information by the local consistency assumption, thus can
better fit the data. We also conducted significant test and all the
p-value < 0.01, which confirms that our method significantly out-
performs the baselines. In addition, we can see that the prediction
result in the DNF dataset is better than that in the QQSpeed dataset,
which might be due to the reason that new payer is more sparse in
the QQSpeed dataset.
Feature Contribution Analysis. In the proposed method, we
consider three different categories of features: user attribute fea-
tures (A), social effect features (S) and in-game behavior features
3http://scikit-learn.org
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Figure 5: Feature contribution analysis based on the QQSpeed
dataset
(B). Here we examine the contribution of different categories of
features in LCFM model based on the QQSpeed dataset. Specifi-
cally, first we use all three categories of features to train a LCFM
model, denoted as LCFM. Then we respectively remove one of the
three categories of features, denoted as LCFM-A, LCFM-S, and
LCFM-B. We train and evaluate the prediction performance of the
different versions of the LCFM model. In Figure 5, we can ob-
serve clear drop on the performance when ignoring each category
of features. This indicates that our method works well by combin-
ing different categories of features and each category of features in
our method contributes improvement in the performance.
Social Effects Analysis. We further present an in-depth analy-
sis on how different social effects affect the performance of new
payer prediction. Table 3 shows the prediction performance of
the proposed LCFM by considering different social effects in the
QQSpeed dataset. We firstly analyze each individual social effect.
In Part A of Table 3, Attribute&Behavior stands for the LCFM
method by considering only user attribute features and in-game be-
havior features. +Social influence indicates that we add the so-
cial influence based features into the Attribute&Behavior method.
+Strong/Weak tie (or +Status or +Structural diversity) indicates
we further add more social based features. By incorporating each
type of social effect features, we observe clear improvement com-
pared to the Attribute&Behavior method. We can also see that the
strong/weak tie features and the structural diversity features are the
most useful social effect features in predicting new paying users.
Next, we analyze the combination effects of the social based fea-
tures. In Part B of Table 3, “All Features” stands for the LCFM
method by considering all three categories of features. -Social in-
fluence (or -Strong/Weak tie or -Status or -Structural diversity) re-
spectively indicates that we remove individual social based features
from the All Features method. It is interesting to see that the per-
formance indeed drops but not significantly when only removing
one type of the social feature. This implies that different types of
social features have strong inter-correlation with each other. An-
other interesting phenomenon is that status seems to be a “weak”
social feature to improve the prediction performance (Part A); how-
ever, without it (Part B) the model results in a most performance
decrease compared to other social features.
6.3 Online Performance
We have deployed a new payer prediction system based on the
proposed algorithm and applied it to several famous games such
as Dungeon & Fighter Online (DNF) and QQSpeed. Basically, for
each game, with users’ activity logs, the system trains a LCFM
model periodically on data collected from all users, and then uses
the trained model to estimate the paying potential of free users.
Table 3: Social effect analysis based on the QQSpeed
dataset.(%)
Features used AUC Rec. Prec. F1
A
Attribute&Behavior 72.28 32.30 12.45 17.97
+Social influence 74.65 33.29 14.46 20.17(+2.20%)
+Strong/Weak tie 74.75 33.31 14.67 20.37(+2.40%)
+Status 74.08 32.39 13.88 19.43(+1.46%)
+Structural diversity 74.75 32.39 14.86 20.38(+2.41%)
B
All Features 74.90 33.67 14.72 20.49
-Social influence 74.88 33.73 14.67 20.45(-0.04%)
-Strong/Weak tie 74.88 33.19 14.80 20.48(-0.01%)
-Status 74.77 33.15 14.66 20.33(-0.16%)
-Structural diversity 74.89 32.90 14.84 20.45(-0.04%)
Figure 6: A screenshot of the promotion activity for online test
Finally, the game operator uses the prediction results for market
decision making. To validate its effectiveness, we conducted two
online tests in the game QQSpeed based on the deployed system,
and compared our method with the prior strategy used in the game.
The prior strategy suggests users mainly according to their activi-
ties. We use a new metric Lift_Ratio to evaluate our method , which
can evaluate different methods at the macro-level. It is defined as
Lift_Ratio =
CR− CRprior
CRprior
(10)
where CR is the new payer conversion rate of a specific method
and CRprior is the new payer conversion rate of the prior strategy.
For each online test, we use different methods to select a test
group of users and a control group of users. A user may belong
to more than one group, e.g. both the test group and the control
group. Then, we send invitation messages to all the selected users.
A user will receive only one message even if the user belongs to
more than one group. The content of the messages is to invite the
user to attend a promotion activity4 in which the user only needs
to pay some amounts of money, then the user can participate in a
lottery draw to get props in QQSpeed. Figure 6 shows a screenshot
of the promotion activity’s web page.
In online test 1, we focus on validating the effectiveness of the
proposed method in online scenario, while in online test 2, we em-
phatically analyze the contribution of social factor.
4http://speed.qq.com/act/a20131220djcj/index.htm
Table 4: Results of the two online tests.
Online Test 1 Online Test 2
2013.12.27 - 2014.1.3 2014.1.24 - 2014.1.27
Group name test group control group test group control group prior group
Group size 600K 200K 400K 400K 200K
#Message read 345K 106K 229K 215K 106K
Message read rate 57.50% 53.00% 57.25% 53.75% 53.00%
#Message clicked 47584 7466 23325 20922 6299
Message clicked rate 7.93% 3.73% 5.83% 5.23% 3.15%
Lift_Ratio 196.87% 0% 126.81% 73.40% 0%
Online Test 1. We select all the free users who have logined
during Nov. 20th, 2013 to Dec. 20th, 2013 to form a candidate
user set. Then we use the LCFM model to calculate the paying
potential score of each user in the candidate user set. We select the
top 600,000 users to form the test group and use the prior strategy
to select 200,000 users to form the control group. We send the
invitation tips on Dec. 27th, 2013, and collect results from Dec.
27th, 2013 to Jan. 3rd, 2014.
The test results are showed in Table 4. We can see that our
method significantly outperforms the baseline (p-value < 0.01)
and brings 196% relative improvement in the conversion rate com-
pared to the prior selection method, which validates the effective-
ness of our method in online scenario.
Online Test 2. We evaluate the contribution of social factor in
the online scenario in this test using the similar method with online
test 1. The candidate user set is comprised of free users who have
logined during Dec. 20th, 2013 to Jan. 20th, 2014. We select three
groups of users from the candidate user set. The first group is the
test group. It contains high paying potential users recommended by
the proposed LCFM model. The second group is the control group,
which contains high score users predicted by our model by remov-
ing social effect related features. The third group is prior group,
which contains users selected by the prior strategy. The invitation
tips are sent on Jan. 24th, 2014, and the results are collected from
Jan. 24th, 2014 to Jan. 27th, 2014.
Table 4 shows the results of online test 2. As we can see,
Lift_Ratio in the test group is 172% higher than that in the control
group, and the differences between the algorithms are statistically
significant (p-value < 0.01), which demonstrates that social factor
plays an important role in modeling and predicting users’ paying
behavior. Besides, we can see that the Lift_Ratio of the test group
in online test 2 is lower than that in online test 1. We investigate
this issue by calculating the overlap of the test groups in the two
online tests. And we find that 17% of the users in the test group
of online test 2 have been sent invitation tips in the first online test.
Therefore, the performance decrease in online test 2 might be due
to the reason that most of the users who have high predicted score
and are interested in the promotion activity have already been cov-
ered in online test 1. Hence, the test group of online test 2 contains
a part of the users who are not interested in the promotion activity
in online test 1. Therefore the Lift_Ratio measure is lower in online
test 2.
7. RELATED WORK
Online games have billions of users worldwide. Analyzing and
mining the big data from online games becomes an important topic
for understanding users’ behaviors. We review related literature
from three aspects: attribute analysis, social analysis, and game
application.
Attribute Analysis. This line of research mainly focuses on study-
ing users’ demographic attributes and their effects on users’ behav-
ior in the game. For example, Yee [30] investigated how players
differ from one another and how motivations of play relate to age,
gender, usage patterns, and in-game behaviors. Lou et al. [21] in-
vestigated an interesting problem of “gender swapping”, i.e., users
choose avatars of gender opposite to their natural ones. However,
all the studies ignore the social effects.
Social Analysis. Recently, more and more researchers start to
analyze users’ interaction in the game network. Ducheneaut and
Moore [11] studied the users’ interaction patterns in the online
game. Son et al. [27] also provided an interesting study on an
MMORPGs game. They focused on studying the interplay between
distinct types of user interaction networks in the virtual world.
Some other research also studies the group patterns of game users.
For example, Patil et al. [24] investigated the problem of group dy-
namics in game social network. They developed a predictive model
to predict the dynamic change of group in an online role-playing
game (World of Warcraft). Ducheneaut et al. [12] used longitudinal
data collected from the online game to examine play and grouping
patterns. They found several interesting patterns that affect the for-
mation and longevity gaming communities. Tang et al. [28] studied
how to quantify social influence in large social networks. However,
all of the aforementioned works do not consider the users’ paying
behavior. In practice, users’ play patterns and social activities in
the game are strongly affected by their paying status.
Game Application. The game-related approaches have also been
used in many other fields such as web search and image recogni-
tion. For example, Bennett et al. [4] studied users’ collaborative
behavior in the labeling game, where users get reward if they pro-
vide consensus ranking labels of images for given queries. Arase
et al. [3] developed a game based approach to attract users to label
geographical relevance of web images. Daniel et al. [9] aimed to
collect a crowd of users by leveraging games as a tool, and their
focus is to develop an underlying data management framework.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study an interesting problem of predicting po-
tential new paying users in online game networks. By investigating
several social patterns and their effects on users’ paying behavior,
we found strong social influence on users’ paying behavior in the
game network. Based on the discoveries, we develop a local con-
sistent factorization machines(LCFM) model by incorporating the
network information into the factorization model. The model can
effectively recognize potential paying users and significantly out-
performs alternative methods. We have deployed the model in on-
line games and the online test results further confirm the effective-
ness of the proposed model.
Using social network techniques to study online gaming data is
an intriguing research direction. As for the future work, it would be
interesting to connect users’ virtual network in the game with their
physical daily life to study how online affects offline. It would
be also interesting to connect the study with other social theories
to further investigate dynamic changes of the network structure in
online games. As for the model, it is also important to develop
an interactive learning mechanism so that the model can directly
incorporate users’ feedback.
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